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Introduction 
Fiscal devolution ensured that by April 2019 
the Welsh Government and local authorities 
controlled nearly £5 billion of tax revenues, 
corresponding to 30% of their combined 
current spending. The taxes devolved are 
Council Tax and Non-Domestic (Business) 
Rates, Income Tax (partially), the Land 
Transaction Tax and Landfill Disposals Tax 
(replacing Stamp Duty Land Tax and Landfill 
Tax). This last pair of taxes are collected and 
managed by the newly formed Welsh 
Revenue Authority. In addition, a shortlist of 
four new tax ideas was announced alongside 
the outline draft Budget 2018-19 – a vacant 
land tax, a social care levy, a disposable 
plastics tax and a tourism tax. All the existing 
taxes are not only necessary to cover 
expenditure in the current fiscal year but also 
to cope with future trends. As warned by the 
Wales Centre for Public Policy, the current 
bases that are taxed are likely to constrain 
future spending – due to low employment 
rates, wages and population growth (Ifan and 
Poole 2018). This paper examines some of 
the possibilities for Welsh tax changes and 
improvement. 
Tax fairness and appropriateness 
Taxes are rarely popular, and they mostly 
change people’s behaviour counter-
productively (Brewer et al, 2010). A good tax 
system should therefore aim to minimise 
adverse side effects while achieving revenue, 
distributional and other objectives. Some 
taxes might change taxpayers’ behaviour 
helpfully, as would be the intention of a plastic 
bottle tax. Keeping tax administration and 
compliance costs as low as possible must be 
desirable. Taxes should be fair in the sense of 
avoiding unwarranted discrimination and 
satisfying taxpayers reasonable expectations. 
It is also preferable that people can and do 
understand how their taxes are assessed. 
To prepare for the exercise of their tax powers 
the Welsh Government initiated a survey, 
between 2016 and 2018, to assess the extent 
to which Welsh people understood which 
taxes were controlled by the Welsh 
Government (Owens and Jones, 2019). For 
the purposes of considering tax reform it 
would be helpful also to understand attitudes 
to various forms of taxation. For example, the 
Lyons Review when considering the Council 
Tax reported a survey of English attitudes 
(Lyons, 2007, p.226). The survey found that 
55% thought it unfair that they should pay 
more council tax if their house increased in 
value more than others, against 25% thinking 
it fair. The same proportion (55%) felt basing 
council tax on house values was unfair but 
about 30% thought it fair1. One explanation for 
the majority perception of unfairness may be 
simply that most taxes people pay are 
administered by firms; council tax is one of the 
few that is not and therefore hurts more. Or 
perhaps taxpayers believe they should not 
pay more when only the exchange value of 
their property has increased, because this 
confers no immediate advantage on them; the 
use value of their property has not been 
enhanced. There is also the matter of 
considering taxation over the lifecycle. A tax 
on property could be seen as a tax on 
cumulated life savings by asset rich and 
income poor pensioners. 
For some economists, taxing housing, and 
more particularly the land on which it is built, 




is desirable, as is taxing the land on which 
business operates. Economists suggest that 
taxes on land, and on anything else in 
perfectly inelastic supply, does not trigger 
adverse behaviours. Ultimately an increase or 
decrease in business rates simply raises or 
lowers the rent landlords can charge. It does 
not affect the amount of land supplied. And it 
takes away from people who do not contribute. 
The ability to pay rent stems from productive 
efforts of businessmen or of residents, not of 
landlords. An implication is that dedicated 
student rental housing is more profitable for 
landlords than other forms of residence 
because students do not pay council tax - 
though they may also have less ability than the 
average occupant to pay rent. Economic 
theory indicates that what matters is that 
council tax and non-domestic rates are 
payable not only on land but on the structures 
and developments on it. These taxes are a 
disincentive to invest in improvement, though 
some maintain that housing is no different 
from other consumption goods and so housing 
services should be taxed at the VAT rate 
(Mirrlees 2011, et al. ch. 16)2. As the Lyons 
survey suggests, taxing housing services at 
20% is not likely to be popular with tenants 
and householders.  
Another, more easily remedied, objection to 
council tax is that it is regressive; the 
proportion of income spent on the tax typically 
reduces with the taxpayers’ income. This 
could be addressed by introducing more 
valuation bands. Valuation of business 
properties is more problematic because the 
markets are more specialised and thinner. 
Valuation officers currently apply several rules 
of thumb that give rise to a large number of 
appeals. A review in England concluded 
nonetheless that this method was preferable 
to self-assessment (H M Government 2018). 
The tax assessment problem points to an 
advantage of the capital gains tax; it taxes a 
definite undisputable market figure for the 
increase in the business property or second 
home value. The potential drawback for the 
tax revenue authority is that the revenue is 
only paid when the gains are realised, in 
contrast to the annual payments of the non-
domestic rates and council tax. 
Welsh income tax 
As noted, a merit of the two taxes discussed 
above, insofar as they tax land, is that the tax 
base will not move or change if the tax rate 
goes up. In principle this is not the case for 
labour and capital, which matters for Wales 
especially if its income tax rates diverge from 
England’s. The predicted effect on tax 
revenue of an alteration in the income tax rate 
may differ from the ‘mechanical effect’ 
(multiplying the change in tax rate by the 
incomes of the taxpayers). Those taxed may 
vary their effort or innovativeness, they may 
alter where they live and the consequences of 
all these decisions may have impacts on the 
economy that further affect tax revenue. Such 
migration and economy ‘spillover’ effects of 
possible income tax changes were 
investigated in a recent study (Foreman-Peck 
and Zhou, 2019). 
Whereas the Scottish government reduced 
the lower Scottish tax rate and increased the 
higher rates in 2018, the Welsh government 
may be expected to be more restrained in 
making similar income tax changes. The 
economy in Wales is more closely integrated 
with England than the Scottish economy. 
Around 95,000 people commuted out of 
Wales and almost 48,000 commuted in during 
2018 (StatsWales 2019a). In 2017-18 net 
migration to Wales from the rest of the UK was 
just under 9,000, with net outflows for persons 
aged 15-29 (Stats Wales 2019b). Over 1.4 
million people in Wales (48% of the total) live 
within 25 miles of the border with England, and 
more than 4 million live within the same 
distance on the English side of the boundary 
(Figure 1). By contrast only  about 200,000 
people in Scotland and 260,000 in England 
are within 25 miles of the border between 
these countries. An income tax difference 
from England is therefore more likely to trigger 
substantial migration between England and 
Wales than between England and Scotland. 
 





Source: Holtham Report 2010, Chart 4.5 
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By contrast only  about 200,000 people in 
Scotland and 260,000 in England are within 
25 miles of the border between these 
countries. An income tax difference from 
England is therefore more likely to trigger 
substantial migration between England and 
Wales than between England and Scotland. 
An illustration of the possible migration effects 
of higher rate income tax changes is that a five 
percent increase in the higher rate of tax for 
an individual or household earning £80,000 
would result in almost £2,000 a year more 
being paid in tax by the individual or 
household. Over ten years with a five percent 
discount rate this equates to about £15,000, 
which might more than counterbalance 
relocation costs. In which case, all the tax 
Figure 1: The differences between the Welsh border and Scottish border 
 




revenue paid by that individual or household 
would be lost to Wales. Tax rate increases 
may also provide a disincentive to relocations 
into the jurisdiction that might otherwise have 
taken place. 
For higher earners the revenue impact of tax-
induced mobility would be greater. If only 150 
of Wales’s highest earners moved out of 
Wales (10% of the total number earning over 
£250,000 per year) no additional revenue 
would be raised from Welsh residents as a 
result of a one pence higher rate tax increase 
(Holtham, 2010, para 6.22). Conversely 
cutting the higher rate could potentially 
increase Welsh tax revenue, although there 
could be problems of determining residential 
location and second homes.  
The difficulty is that with no experience of 
differential tax rates there is no direct evidence 
of how much migration might be induced if 
income tax rates did diverge. A naïve solution 
is to use another country’s experience to shed 
light on the UK scenario (such as Liebig and 
Souza-Poza, 2006, on Switzerland), but 
because of different institutional, geographical 
and economic conditions this empirical 
approach is not reliable. At the other extreme, 
purely theoretical models can be built and 
utilized, as in HMRC (2013). Nevertheless, 
such a model is not capable of capturing the 
tax effect on within-UK migration flows. Any 
judgement on this matter without a strict link 
with data is inevitably arbitrary. In view of the 
drawbacks of both empirical and theoretical 
modelling approaches, this paper uses a 
systematic framework consistently integrating 
both a structural economic model and an 
econometric model, utilising the only 
substantial source of tax differences between 
areas in England and Wales, the Council tax 
(for more details see Foreman-Peck and 
Zhou, 2019).  
The effects of council tax differences 
(observable) and the effects of income tax 
differences (unobservable) can be equivalent 
if the magnitudes are carefully selected. 
Hence, the effect of an income tax difference 
can be simulated by translating it into a council 
tax difference. The two taxes affect taxpayers’ 
budgets differently – council tax raises the 
price of housing relative to other goods and 
services whereas income tax does not. In 
Figure 2, with housing plotted on the vertical 
axis and other consumption on the horizontal, 
the household budget constraint is indicated 
by the black solid line joining both axes. A cut 
in the housing (council) tax pivots the (now 
red) budget line because more housing can be 
consumed after the tax cut. The tangency of 
the budget line with the curved utility or 
wellbeing lines indicates the optimum 
consumption choices – first ℎ and 𝑐, then ℎ′ 
and 𝑐′. The income tax equivalent of a council 
tax difference (the green line) - corrects for the 
different budget gradients while maintaining 
the same level of (subjective) well-being, here 
reducing housing consumption to ℎ′′ and 
increasing general consumption to 𝑐′′.   
Figure 2: The Income tax equivalence of 
Council Tax 
 
A simple Computable General Equilibrium 
(CGE) model of the Welsh economy is 
constructed and calibrated to simulate these 
two equilibria. Three types of individuals are 
specified to correspond with those paying the 
three rates of incomes (Basic, Higher and 
Additional). When the lowest rate of income 
tax changes (Basic Rate of income tax, 20%) 
all three types of individuals are affected, 
when the 40% Higher Rate changes those 
paying the Additional Rate of 45% are also 
affected. Council tax is more selective; a 
 




specific property tax only affects one type of 
taxpayer. Property (council) tax rates for each 
of the three types of individuals thus must be 
utilised to estimate the equivalent income tax. 
Supplementing the CGE model is an 
econometric model of migration because of 
the lack of prior information about tax-induced 
migration. The CGE model predicts the tax 
revenue consequences of hypothetical 
income tax changes. It does so by making 
appropriate adjustments as indicated above 
because current (here, property) taxes have 
different bases from the counter-factual 
income tax. When the econometrically 
estimated migration response is added in, the 
CGE model computes the full economic effect 
(Figure 3).  










In the econometric model the variable to be 
explained is the bilateral flows of migration 
between 348 local authorities in England and 
Wales. The results suggest that between 
about half the local authority pairs there was 
no migration. Wage levels are assumed to be 
fixed by migration and trade, as Wales is a 
small open economy and in order to keep the 
exercise as simple as possible. This allows 
local policies, such as tax, to determine the 
long run equilibrium population and the 
migration necessary to achieve it. Migration 
determines output and, by changing tax 
bases, influences tax yields. 
The ‘mechanical effect’ dominates the 
migration effect for the Welsh government 
when the Basic Rate (BR) of income tax is 
increased.  If BR rises by 5p, income tax 
generated in Wales will rise by 8.02%, about 
2 percentage points less than the full 
mechanical effect. Income tax kept by Wales 
will rise by 30% but total tax revenue 
generated in Wales drops by 1.9%. For tax 
revenue as a whole the migration effect 
dominates because the change in population 













For Higher Rate (HR) changes, there is a 
similar asymmetric pattern between income 
tax generated in, and kept by, Wales for 
similar reasons. Behavioural responses 
exactly offset mechanical effects when the 
Additional Rate (AR) is altered, so there is 
very little effect on tax revenue.  
Output per worker responds to the opening of 
tax differentials between England and Wales 
and the induced migration by changing the 
proportions of taxpayer types in the Welsh 
Notes: (1) answers the question “What is the relationship between the effects of different council taxes and 
different income taxes?” and (2) answers the question “What are the effects of different council taxes on the 
migration flow into Wales?” Combine (1) and (2) to answer the main research question “What is the overall 
effect of changes in income tax on the overall economy?” 
 




population. These types have different 
productivities and so average productivity of 
the economy responds to the type of tax 
changes. A Basic Rate increase affects all 
taxpayers and the proportional effect is 
greater on (higher productivity) HR payers 
than BR payers, reducing output per worker.  
Total tax revenue responds in a similar fashion 
to output per worker. A BR or HR tax rise loses 
the UK government tax revenue while the 
Welsh government’s revenue increases. In 
setting the HR and BR of devolved income tax 
the interests of the Welsh and UK 
governments are opposed. With such a small 
proportion of revenue devolved, tax-induced 
migration reduces Welsh government revenue 
by quite a small proportion. But the spillovers 
to the wider economy and the impact on other 
Welsh tax revenues collected by the UK 
government are greater. 
Conclusion 
If Welsh taxes were entirely devolved, the 
divergence of interest between UK and Welsh 
governments in income tax rate setting might 
be resolved. But the cautions about the 
prospects for even the limited Welsh tax base 
suggest this would be problematic for Wales.  
Another difficulty with changing Welsh income 
tax rates is that beneficial effects may take 
some time to emerge and depend on whether 
the tax change is expected to be long lasting. 
So, a cut in income tax may eventually 
increase revenue when the behavioural 
responses offset the mechanical effect. But 
meanwhile the government’s budget faces a 
shortfall that must be financed. 
In the search for tax revenue, changing 
income tax rates seems perilous. If there are 
other policy objectives to be achieved by 
reducing them, it is advisable to seek a 
broader tax base. ap Gwilym (2017) has 
suggested a land value tax should replace 
income tax entirely and as noted, the Welsh 
Government is considering the practicalities 
(Bangor n.d.). Such a tax may appeal to 
economists on the theoretical grounds 
discussed earlier, though a shift of the 
proposed magnitude could present major 
administrative challenges. A less radical 
approach would be to make Council Tax 
(which includes an implicit tax on land) more 
progressive by introducing some higher 




1 The questions asked in the Rowlingson et al. (2015) survey are more concerned with 
redistribution than with acceptability of tax types. For example, the questionnaire included a 
proposal to replace Council tax with a 0.6% tax on house values. This may have been more 
popular in Wales because house prices were lower there and therefore so would be the Council 
tax replacement. 
2 This position neglects the extent to which some housing is a necessity whereas there are 
substitutes for most other VAT-able consumption items. 
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